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 WHAT IS EVOLUTION? A RESPONSE TO BAMFORTH
 Michael J. O'Brien, R. Lee Lyman, and Robert D. Leonard
 Douglas Bamforth 's recent paper in American Antiquity, "Evidence and Metaphor in Evolutionary Archaeology," charges
 that Darwinism has little to offer archaeology except in a metaphorical sense. Specifically, Bamforth claims that arguments
 that allegedly link evolutionary processes to the archaeological record are unsustainable. Given Bamforth's narrow view
 of evolution-that it must be defined strictly in terms of changes in gene frequency-he is correct. But no biologist or pale-
 ontologist would agree with Bamforth 's claim that evolution is a process that must be viewedfundamentally at the microlevel.
 Evolutionary archaeology has argued that materials in the archaeological record are phenotypic in the same way that hard
 parts of organisms are. Thus changes in the frequencies of archaeological variants can be used to monitor the effects of
 selection and drift on the makers and users of those materials. Bamforth views this extension of the human phenotype as
 metaphorical because to him artifacts are not somatic features, meaning their production and use are not entirely controlled
 by genetic transmission. He misses the critical point that in terms of evolution, culture is as significant a transmission sys-
 tem as genes are. There is nothing metaphorical about viewing cultural transmission from a Darwinian point of view.
 El reciente trabajo de Douglas Bamforth que apareci6 en American Antiquity y Ilamado "Evidencia y mettifora en Arqueologia
 Evolutiva" acusa al darvinismo de tener poco que ofrecer a la arqueologia excepto en un amplio sentido metaforico. Especi-
 ficamente, Bamforth afirma que los argumentos que supuestamente conectan la seleccion y el desplazamiento con el registro
 arqueologico son insostenibles. Dada la opini6n estrecha de la evolucio'n-que deber ser estrictamente definida en terminos
 de cambios en frecuencia de genes-tiene razon. Pero ningin bi6logo o paleont6logo estaria de acuerdo con la acusacion de
 Bamforth de que la evolucion es un proceso que deber ser considerado fundamentalmente al nivel micro. La arqueologia evo-
 lutiva ha sostenido que los materiales en el registro arqueol6gico sonfenotipos de la misma manera que lo son las partes duras
 de los organismos. De esta manera, los cambios en las frecuencias de las variantes arqueoldgicas pueden ser usados para
 seguir de cerca los efectos de la seleccion y el desplazamiento en losfabricantes y usuarios de esos materiales. Bamforth con-
 sidera esta extension de los fenotipos humanos como metaforica porque en su opinion los artefactos no son caracteristicas
 somdticas, lo que quiere decir que su produccion y uso no estdn controlados completamente por transmision genetica. El no
 capta el punto critico que en terminos de evolucion, la cultura es un sistema de transmision tan significante como los genes.
 No hay nada metaforico en considerar la transmisi6n cultural desde un punto de vista darviniano.
 ~~TW e appreciate constructive criticisms of
 evolutionary archaeology (EA here-
 after) (e.g., Boone and Smith 1998;
 Preucel 1999; Schiffer 1996; Shennan 2002; Weiss
 and Hayashida 2002) because they cause us both
 to clarify certain points we have made and to recon-
 sider other points in a new light. In responding to
 these criticisms, we have been able not only to con-
 centrate on highlighting epistemological differ-
 ences between EA and, say, human behavioral
 ecology (Lyman and O'Brien 1998) and behav-
 ioral archaeology (O'Brien et al. 1998) but also to
 point out significant areas of agreement among the
 various approaches (O'Brien and Lyman 2000a,
 2002a). By doing so we hope to set the stage for
 an evolutionary synthesis in archaeology similar to
 that which occurred in biology and paleontology
 in the late 1930s and early 1940s, referred to as the
 New Synthesis (Huxley 1942).
 The most recent criticism of EA is by Douglas
 Bamforth (2002), who maintains that the use of
 evolutionary theory and principles in archaeology
 is strictly metaphorical. According to Bamforth
 (2002:435), any arguments that link selection, or for
 that matter any other evolutionary process, to
 archaeological data are "unsustainable." Other
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 archaeologists have flatly rejected EA, but Bamforth
 is one of the few to offer a detailed explanation for
 so doing. His considerable efforts notwithstanding,
 Bamforth's argument is flawed and unconvincing.
 Bamforth not only mischaracterizes Darwinism but
 draws what at best can be labeled a caricature of
 EA, which we suspect is attributable to his making
 only a cursory examination of the now-extensive lit-
 erature on the subject. Bamforth is selective in his
 citations and leaves out, for example, the book-
 length treatment of EA by O'Brien and Lyman
 (2000b) that became available a year and half before
 his revised manuscript was accepted. Had Bam-
 forth read that book, or any of a number of articles
 written in the mid-to-late 1990s, many of the issues
 he raises, especially those having to do with paral-
 lels between EA and paleontology, would have been
 addressed. Would they have been addressed to his
 satisfaction? Probably not. We suspect that even
 had he read those works, Bamforth would not have
 altered his opinion or his article. He still would have
 claimed that EA-and he fingers human behavioral
 ecology as well-uses evolutionary theory
 metaphorically to study the past.
 Why can Bamforth make such a claim? First,
 like other anthropologists before him, and despite
 all evidence to the contrary, Bamforth builds an
 inaccurate distinction between humanity and the
 rest of the natural world. Like it or not, culture and
 its material consequences are the result of biolog-
 ical phenomena. Following this, Bamforth asserts
 that archaeologists using evolutionary theory do not
 make any useful connections between evolution-
 ary process and the material record. This argument
 can be made only under his narrow, reductionist def-
 inition of evolution. Bamforth adopts a familiar
 argumentative gambit: Structure the premise in
 such a way that the conclusion has to be true. And
 in Bamforth's case it works, but only rhetorically.
 If we were to view evolution solely in his terms,
 then we would agree with him that EA would not
 even be possible, let alone have any merit as a sci-
 entific approach to studying the past. But we do not
 agree with his limited definition of evolution, nor
 do biologists or paleontologists. We focus much of
 our attention here on the issue of what evolution
 entails because Bamforth's entire case rests on how
 one defines the term-as does the case of anyone
 involved in historical science. This is anything but
 a semantic issue.
 Evolution Is More Than Genes
 Bamforth (2002:436) assumes as his starting point
 "the universally understood meaning of 'evolution'
 [which] refers most fundamentally to changes
 through time in the relative frequency of genes in
 a given biological population." He does this "not
 because [evolution] cannot mean something more
 general but because using this narrow definition
 helps to identify important limits on archaeology's
 access to evolutionary process" (Bamforth
 2002:436). No one seriously doubts the role played
 by genes in evolution, but it is only a role. The
 important point is, evolution means significantly
 more than simply changes in allelic frequencies,
 and it is in that expanded arena that archaeology,
 biology, and paleontology fit comfortably. As has
 been pointed out numerous times, Darwin had no
 accurate hypothesis of biological heritability,
 although he knew that it was critically important
 to evolution. His theory of descent with modifica-
 tion can be written simply, without reference to
 genes, by using the more general term replica-
 tors-an entity that passes on its structure during
 reproduction (Godfrey-Smith 2000; Hull 1988).
 Replicators have the ability to increase in frequency
 exponentially, but there is a limited supply of
 resources they can use to do so. Thus, replicators
 compete for those materials, and those that are bet-
 ter competitors are more successful at replicating
 themselves. This notion of replicators is as impor-
 tant to EA as it is to biology and paleontology-a
 point that we and others have made repeatedly
 (Leonard and Jones 1987; Lyman and O'Brien
 1998; Neff 2000, 2001; O'Brien and Lyman 2000a,
 2002a).
 The notion of competition between replicators
 and their resulting differential reproduction defines
 evolution via natural selection, but it leaves out
 drift and other sorting processes (Vrba and Gould
 1986) that influence the differential reproduction
 of replicators. These processes became part of evo-
 lutionary theory only in the days of the New Syn-
 thesis-a period in which Darwin's mechanism of
 natural selection and the ideas of geneticists were
 wed to form the modem version of evolutionary
 theory. Did biologists immediately adopt a defini-
 tion of evolution as genetic change? No. Ernst
 Mayr, a chief architect of the Synthesis, noted that
 to him and other naturalists in the 1940s, "evolu-
 tion was not a change in gene frequencies but the
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 twin processes of adaptive change and the origin
 of [taxonomic] diversity" (Mayr 1991:147). Given
 our reading of Mayr's (1942) first major book on
 evolution, his retrospective statement is accurate.
 What about later definitions-those made well
 after the unification of the naturalists and the geneti-
 cists? John Endler's (1986:5) definition is typical:
 Evolution is "any net directional change or any
 cumulative change in the characteristics of organ-
 isms or populations over many generations-in
 other words, descent with modification. It explic-
 itly includes the origin as well as the spread of alle-
 les, variants, trait values, or character states." Endler
 (1986:14) also states that evolution "is more than
 merely a change in trait distributions or allele fre-
 quencies." In other words, contrary to Bamforth's
 alleged universally understood, "fundamental" def-
 inition, (1) phenotypic traits and characters rather
 than just genes can change both their states and their
 frequencies of expression; (2) they can change
 within a population as a result of vertical trans-
 mission, or what Darwin termed descent with mod-
 ification; and (3) they can also change between
 populations as a result of horizontal transmission,
 or what Endler refers to as "spread." Finally, in one
 of the leading textbooks in evolutionary biology,
 evolution is defined without reference to genes.
 Mark Ridley (1993:5) states that "Evolution means
 change, change in the form and behavior of organ-
 isms between generations," and in the glossary to
 that book Ridley (1993:634) defines evolution as
 "the change in a lineage of populations between
 generations." These changes, spread over geolog-
 ical time, are what paleontologists study.
 In short, there is no evidence to support Bam-
 forth's "universally understood" definition of evo-
 lution. In paleontology, a discipline that Bamforth
 holds up as model of how evolutionary theory can
 be applied to the study of the past in non-
 metaphorical terms, George Gaylord Simpson
 (1949a:205-206) noted shortly after the Synthesis
 that evolution "may be considered as change in
 genetic composition of populations, as morpho-
 logic change in ancestral-descendent lines, or as
 taxonomic progression and diversification within
 a line or complex of larger taxonomic scope. There
 are thus genetic, morphologic, and taxonomic rates
 of evolution." A few years earlier in his book Tempo
 and Mode in Evolution, which formed part of the
 framework for the Synthesis, Simpson (1944:xxix)
 attempted to wed knowledge of genetics with pale-
 ontology but admitted that "One cannot identify any
 particular set of alleles in fossils, but one can rec-
 ogniz  phenomena that are comparable with those
 caused by alleles under experimental conditions."
 That is, paleontologists must assume that the phe-
 notypic changes they perceive among a sequence
 of fossils comprising a lineage represent genetic
 change. This fact is still admitted by paleontolo-
 gists (e.g., Eldredge 1989, 1999), and it always will
 be. Even biologists who call on the fossil record as
 evidence of evolution admit this. For example, biol-
 ogist John Moore (2002:90) recently observed,
 "evolution is a historical science, which means that
 very little can be verified by direct observation."
 The fossil record particularly does "not actually
 show the process of change of one species into
 another-it could not, since fossils are not living
 and so do not mutate, reproduce, and undergo selec-
 tion" (Moore 2002:82). And yet mutation, repro-
 duction, and selection are precisely what Bamforth
 alleges that paleontologists study directly.
 Because paleontologists cannot directly per-
 ceive either genes or changes in frequencies of alle-
les over time, they spent considerable time
 worrying about how to adapt the biological-species
 concept that emerged from the Synthesis (e.g.,
 Arkell and Moy-Thomas 1940; Imbrie 1957;
 Sylvester-Bradley 1956). Ultimately, they acknowl-
 edged that fossil "species" were units bounded by
 morphometric criteria rather than by genetic or
 behavioral (reproductive behavior, particularly)
 ones (Newell 1949; Simpson 1940). As a result, fos-
 sil taxa were typically defined on the basis of mul-
 tiple specimens (Newell 1956). These assumptions
 and procedures have carried over to modem pale-
 ontology (e.g., Raup and Stanley 1978). As pale-
 ontologist Richard Fox (1986:73) put it, labeling
 one set of fossils species A and another set species
 B comprises an "interpretation given to fossil evi-
 dence by the mind, within the theoretical frame-
work of a species concept." That theoretical
 framework, irrespective of the chosen species con-
 cept, is Darwinism.
 In his efforts to discredit EA, Bamforth ignores
 these points. Instead, he attempts to show that
 whereas EA uses evolutionary metaphor, paleon-
 tology's "success in studying evolution is
 undoubted" (Bamforth 2002:440). He points out
 that "archaeologists cannot directly observe the
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 actual processes of evolution that operated in the
 past; instead, we are forced to infer the operation
 of these (and other) processes from patterns in
 material culture" (p. 440). We agree. If Bamforth
 were familiar with the paleontological literature, he
 would recognize that he is making the same points
 that paleontologists have been making for decades
 about the fossil record. He continues, "Further-
 more, archaeological data pertain in virtually every
 case to the activities of groups of human beings
 whose social and/or familial relations are unknown,
 and this is especially true for analyses that aggre-
 gate data from sites scattered over large regions and
 long spans of time" (p. 440). Again, we agree. But
 notice that if we substituted "paleontological data"
 for "archaeological data" in the above quote and
 struck the word "human," all paleontologists would
 agree. And yet they do not characterize what they
 do as metaphorical, nor should they.
 Despite what he sees as parallels between
 archaeology and paleontology, to Bamforth those
 similarities are "superficial and profoundly mis-
 leading. The primary data that paleontologists study
 are observations of the skeletal remains of past
 organisms.... The problem of linking temporal
 patterns of change in paleontological data to evo-
 lution essentially does not arise because the link is
 so obvious and relatively well-understood" (Bam-
 forth 2002:440). Here the link to which Bamforth
 is referring is that between genes and phenotype.
 Bamforth (2002:445) defines phenotype as "the
 outcome of an interaction between the information
 included in an organism's genes and the environ-
 ment that organism occupies." We agree. He also
 notes that EA has expanded this term to include arti-
 facts as part of the "extended phenotype," but he
 views this extension as metaphorical. There is noth-
 ing metaphorical about it. As EA has pointed out
 time and again (Dunnell 1989; Leonard 2001;
 Leonard and Jones 1987; O'Brien and Holland
 1995; O'Brien and Lyman 2000b), pots, projectile
 points, houses, and myriad other cultural features
 are phenotypic in the same way that animal "arti-
 facts" are. Being as tied to genes as Bamforth is,
 he should understand that many cultural features-
 weapons and clothing to name a few-function in
 the same manner as a chitinous shell does: to ensure
 the survival of germ-line replicators (Dawkins
 1982). Instead, he misses the point, claiming that
 EA "metaphorically equates the information
 required to produce an artifact with genetic infor-
 mation" (Bamforth 2002:445). This is incorrect.
 What EA has done is to view genes and culture as
 transmission systems that act to create variation.
 Whether or not that variation comes under selec-
 tive control, or whether it drifts along in a popula-
 tion, is another matter. Important to our point here
 is that no evolutionary archaeologist we know of
 has ever equated cultural information with genetic
 formation. Even more importantly, there is noth-
 ing metaphorical about viewing cultural transmis-
 sion from a Darwinian point of view (Boyd and
 Richerson 1985; Durham 1991). That statement
 should be obvious (Bettinger and Eerkens
 1999:239):
 It seems clear to us that cultural transmission
 must affect Darwinian fitness-how could it
 be otherwise? And Darwinian fitness must
 also bear on cultural transmission. Again, how
 could that not be true? At minimum, humans
 must have the biological, hence, genetically
 transmitted, ability for the cultural transmis-
 sion of behaviors that certainly affect
 Darwinian fitness. It is obvious, at the same
 time, that cultural transmission differs in fun-
 damental ways from any form of genetic
 transmission ... Again, this is what we would
 expect.... [A]s with sexual reproduction, the
 human use of cultural transmission is simply
 the exploiting of an evolutionary opportunity.
 To deny that would imply that the culturally
 mediated evolutionary success of anatomi-
 cally modern humans is merely serendipitous
 happenstance.
 Units of cultural transmission can be defined
 the retically as "the largest units of socially trans-
 mitted information that reliably and repeatedly
 withstand transmission" (Pocklington and Best
 1997:81). EA measures "the effect of transmission
 on variability, [and] culture-historical types, as con-
 ceived by archaeologists, are entirely [reasonable
 proxies for] the unit of cultural transmission" (Lipo
 and Madsen 2001:100; emphasis in original). The
 replicative success of these units is what evolu-
 tionary archaeologists seek to explain (Leonard
 2001). Those units that are functional will be sorted
 by natural selection; those that are stylistic will be
 sorted by the vagaries of transmission. Whether the
 former units, as manifest in artifacts, influence the
 biological reproductive success of their human
 bearers is an empirical matter, the assessment of
 which requires the time depth provided by the
 576  [Vol. 68, No. 3, 2003]
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 archaeological record (O'Brien and Holland 1992).
 Sometimes they will, and sometimes they will not.
 And despite Bamforth's claims, EA has used a bat-
 tery of methods, including frequency and occur-
 rence seriation, clade-diversity diagrams, and
 cladograms, to determine this empirically (Lyman
 and O'Brien 2000; O'Brien and Lyman 2000b;
 O'Brien et al. 2001,2002). What EA has not done
 is to develop a scale to measure changing gene fre-
 quencies between generations. Neither has pale-
 ontology.
 Darwinism and a
 "Largely Unchanging Species"
 Perhaps the underlying reason that Bamforth adopts
 the position he does-including his idiosyncratic
 definition of evolution and his approval of paleon-
 tology but not EA as an evolutionary science-is
 captured in this sentence: "Outside of research on
 the archaeology of human ancestors, archaeologi-
 cal data consist of observations made on the arti-
 facts and features left behind by a single, largely
 unchanging species" (Bamforth 2002:440). Here
 Bamforth sounds curiously like a macroevolution-
 ist-one whose interest is not in the day-to-day
 turnover of individuals within a species but in pat-
 terns and rates of change among lineages that lead
 to the origin and multiplication of species. We have
 detailed in numerous places that certain macroevo-
 lutionary concepts, such as punctuated equilibrium
 (O'Brien and Lyman 2000b), and macroevolu-
 tionary methods, such as cladistics and clade-diver-
 sity diagrams (Lyman and O'Brien 2000; O'Brien
 and Lyman 1999, 2000b, 2002a; O'Brien et al.
 2001,2002), are directly applicable to archaeology.
 Importantly, those methods can be used to study
 the remains of a single species such as Homo sapi-
 ens. The critical issue is not that one, two, or ten
 taxa are involved; rather, the issue is a matter of
 carefully choosing one's analytical units (Lyman
 and O'Brien 2002; O'Brien and Lyman 2002b). EA
 will often be forced to study only macroevolution-
 ary change because the analogue of microevolu-
 tionary change among organisms is genetic,
 something no paleontologist has ever claimed to
 be able to monitor directly. Archaeologists are in
 the same situation; they study change in artifacts,
 not change in the ideas behind the artifacts (Lyman
 and O'Brien 2001).
 As we have noted elsewhere (O'Brien and
 Lyman 2000c), most archaeologists have little prob-
 lem with the fact that some 5-6 million years ago
 the line that produced chimpanzees diverged from
 the line that produced hominids and eventually
 embers of the genus Homo. When we see fossils
 lined up in a certain way, and we can see the pro-
 found changes that hominids have gone through
 during the last 5-6 million years, we ask ourselves,
 what else but evolution could have caused such
 large-scale change? Bamforth would agree. But
 what about change over the last 100,000 years? Can
 we see enough morphological change over that span
 to indicate evolution has taken place? Sometimes
 we can, or at least our taxonomic efforts suggest we
 can, although it is more difficult to see the cumula-
 tive changes in phenotypes separated by 100,000
 y ars than it is in phenotypes separated by 5-6 mil-
 lion years. Why? Because various evolutionary
 processes have had 50-60 times longer to effect
 change in the latter sample than in the former. This
 means that the effects are much more evident than
 they are when a shorter period of time is involved.
 Suppose we shorten the period to 10,000 years. Do
 we see any large-scale change? Not very often. Does
 this mean that evolution has stopped operating on
 humans? No, it means simply that in the vast major-
 ity of cases the time span is too short even to begin
 to see the large-scale changes that we customarily
 associate with evolution. Bamforth wants to see
 these large-scale changes so that he can feel assured
 that evolution has taken place. To him, anything
 less than that is not evolution, or at least it is not
 worth studying. He would profit from reading
 Jonathan Weiner's (1994) The Beak of the Finch or
 Peter Grant's (1999) Ecology and Evolution ofDar-
 win's Finches. Both books make it plain that once
 in a while evolution can be seen empirically in suc-
 cessive generations of organisms, and we do not
 need to reach the molecular level to see it.
 Archaeologists are not alone in failing to rec-
 ognize the complementarity of micro- and
 macroevolutionary perspectives when it comes to
 human evolution. Several prominent evolutionary
 biologists and paleontologists (e.g., Gould 1996;
 Huxley 1956; Simpson 1949b) have also stated that
 humans are a "single, largely unchanging species."
 Under this view, evolutionary processes such as
 selection and drift do not operate on humans
 because our capacity for culture has decoupled us
 from evolution. If such is the case, and culture and
 577
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 its attendant features have created a gulf between
 humans and evolutionary processes, then a Dar-
 winian perspective is nonapplicable to the vast
 majority of the archaeological record. We contend,
 however, that culture is simply one adaptive
 response that a particular lineage of organisms
 evolved. As such, it does not exempt its bearers
 from evolutionary processes.
 Invoking culture as a decoupling agent locates
 cause in the wrong place. Culture is a different
 mode of transmission than genes are (Aunger
 2002), but the difference does not lead to the
 inescapable conclusion that humans as organisms
 have evolved the means to stop evolving. Do these
 differences indicate that selection and drift play at
 best minimal roles in reshuffling both somatic and
 nonsomatic characters? No. Humans today are no
 more immune to evolutionary processes than they
 were 30,000 years ago. We agree with what at least
 one evolutionary biologist said about culture: It
 merely altered "the components of fitness [and the]
 directional changes" prompted by selection. "What
 has happened is that the [selective] environment,
 the adjudicator of which genotypes are fit, has been
 altered" (Lerer 1959:181).
 Ignoring the simple dichotomy between long-
 term, cumulative evolutionary results and short-
 term aspects of evolution is responsible for the
 question that bothers Bamforth. That question is,
 "Where's the evolution?" Skeptics such as Bamforth
 are looking for the big results and missing the point
 that those large-scale, cumulative results are the end
 products of countless small-scale changes that took
 place over a very long time period. Paleontologists
 do not have access to the fine detail that archaeol-
 ogists can see, but they do not doubt that their
 macroscale picture comprises literally millions of
 tiny structures and routine processes that went on
 day after day, century after century, millennium
 after millennium. They accept such detail as
 axiomatic, just as they accept that genetic change
 was behind some of the change they see. Conversely,
 archaeologists rarely have access to anything
 approaching the evolutionary big picture, but we
 should not get so lost in detail that we forget that it
 is those details that cumulatively are evolution.
 Conclusions
 In his penultimate section, Bamforth (2002:447)
 states, "like evolutionary archaeology, systems
 archeology was going to finally make us scientists
... and lead us toward theoretical integration with
 other academic disciplines." We find Bamforth's
 statement-indeed, this entire section of his arti-
 cle-irrelevant. That systems theory failed to make
 archaeology a science implies nothing about the
 success or failure of EA or of any other intellectual
 program that offers science as a solution to many
 of the problems in which archaeologists are inter-
 ested. More to the point, EA is not some prescrip-
 tiv  exercise that, if followed, turns one instantly
 into a scientist. All EA does-all it can do-is offer
 a coherent, theoretically grounded approach to
 examining the archaeological record. EA rests on
 the premise that objects in the archaeological
 record, because they were parts of past phenotypes,
 were shaped by the same evolutionary processes
 as were the somatic features of their makers and
users. This is a shorthand way of saying that the
 possessors of the objects were acted on by evolu-
 tionary processes.
 Bamforth (2002:449) closes his review of EA
 by stating, "Rigorous technical analysis and care-
 ful consideration both of multiple lines of evidence
 and of multiple potential explanations for patterns
 i  that evidence are what make us competent sci-
 entists, not our commitment to any particular the-
 oretical perspective. Systems archaeology
 foundered in large part because it failed to deal
 wi  issues like these, and we are well on our way
 to seeing whether or not evolutionary archaeology
 will have the same fate." All we can ask is, where
d es Bamforth think scientific explanation comes
 from if not in large part from theory? To us, expla-
 nation is one part theory and one part empirical
 standard (Leonard 2001; O'Brien and Lyman
 2000b). EA has been particularly clear on where
 the theory comes from-Darwinism as generally
 understood by biologists and paleontologists. It has
 been equally clear that the empirical standards are
 derived from that theory, not simply from received
 archaeological wisdom. The data requirements for
 EA are high, but they usually are in science.
 In sum, we find Bamforth's presentation not
 only unconvincing but disappointing for reasons
 that go far beyond this particular discussion. As
 Bamforth notes, other social sciences are increas-
 ingly embracing the explanatory power of Dar-
 winian evolutionary theory (e.g., Cziko 1995). And
 there are good reasons for this. Evolutionary the-
 [Vol. 68, No. 3, 2003] 578
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 ory, as its growth in sociology, economics, psy-
 chology, and anthropology attests, now arguably
 explains more human behavior than any other the-
 oretical perspective. Yet many anthropologists
 choose to distance themselves from evolutionary
 theory for the simple reason that they deeply desire
 for humanity to be distinct from the biological
 realm, despite all evidence to the contrary. Twenty
 years ago this attitude might have been simply
 unfortunate. Now it is decidedly more problematic,
 as not only does evolutionary theory give us great
 insights into the past and present, it is also clear
 that many problems that confront humanity
 today-global warming, deterioration of the ozone
 layer, global reduction of biodiversity, genetic engi-
 neering, AIDS, cloning, increasing bacterial resis-
 tance to antibiotics, cultural extinction-will
 require knowledge of evolutionary theory to solve.
 Acknowledgments. We gratefully acknowledge comments by
 Tim Kohler, Geoff Clark, and three anonymous reviewers on
 how to improve the manuscript. Maria Sol Colina translated
 the abstract into Spanish.
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